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How Kenya has Implemented and Adjusted to the Changes in International 
Transfer Pricing Regulations: 1920-2016 
 
Attiya Waris 
 
 
Summary 
 
A large proportion of international trade in goods and services is conducted between what 
are known technically as related parties. In practice, most of this trade is between different 
companies forming part of the same transnational corporate grouping. This is typically highly 
integrated in economic and financial terms, while legally appearing as a set of separate 
companies incorporated in a wide range of countries.  
 
For accounting, customs and general tax purposes, any two related companies engaging in 
cross-border transactions need to decide the price that they will set for the goods and 
services they exchange – ideally they will not make a profit off each other, as would be the 
case with unrelated companies. Inevitably, however, these are not market prices but 
administered prices. The process of setting these prices is known as transfer pricing (TP). In 
principle there is a standard mechanism, agreed internationally, to guide transfer pricing – 
the arm’s length principle. This means that cross-border transactions between related parties 
should be booked at the prices that would have applied had these been open competitive 
market transactions between unrelated parties (arm’s length transactions). It can be 
extremely difficult – and sometimes impossible – for revenue authorities to apply the arm’s 
length principle in daily operations.  
 
This paper analyses Kenya’s experience of trying to deal with transfer pricing, and looks at 
difficulties facing developing and middle-income countries in the application of transfer 
pricing rules. It discusses the course Kenya has taken in introducing TP laws, regulations, 
policies and administrative training in order to audit TP transactions effectively. Section 1 
sets out the background to Kenya, its position in the African continent and globally, 
explaining why it has been selected as a case study. Section 2 sets out the historical 
experience of Kenya, both in developing its TP laws, regulations and procedures, as well as 
building capacity of its staff on issues of transfer pricing. Sections 3 and 4 reflect on the 
Kenyan position as set out in Section 2, and the appropriateness of some of the changes 
being proposed internationally by Actions 8-10 and 13 of the BEPS project of the 
G20/OECD. This paper attempts to unpack the issues surrounding TP in a developing 
country like Kenya, and to reflect on what is really needed in the BEPS process to make it 
usable in developing countries. The paper concludes by stating that the issues being raised 
in TP have been only partially resolved through improved capacity, regulations and policy. 
The OECD BEPS process does not seem to resolve problems faced by countries like Kenya, 
but instead foists a set of complex and unwieldy rules on Kenya and other developing and 
middle-income countries. 
 
Keywords:  transfer pricing; cross-border taxation; Kenya; Africa; tax avoidance; base 
erosion and profit shifting. 
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Introduction  
 
While moving towards a simpler, more equitable, transparent and broad-based tax system 
has been a concern of developing countries for decades, even the most basic understanding 
of a tax system can be overwhelming. Data shows that half of sub-Saharan African countries 
still mobilise less than 15 per cent of their GDP in tax revenue, below the minimum level of 
20 per cent considered by the UN as necessary to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals by 2015 (Waris and Kohonen 2011). Unlike developed countries, some of the poorest 
countries rely very heavily on corporate tax revenue from multinational enterprises (MNEs). It 
is therefore critical that developing countries are able to tax the full profits that are realised in 
their jurisdictions, and to reduce opportunities for MNEs to artificially separate the allocation 
of their taxable profits from the jurisdictions in which those profits arise. 
 
Transfer pricing (TP) refers to the pricing of intra-group, cross-border transactions between 
related parties. It is vulnerable to manipulation, including the deliberate misuse or 
misapplication of transfer pricing rules.1 However, in many ways the most important and 
difficult issue is how to determine appropriate criteria for allocating the profits earned by an 
MNE between its various constituent parts. From an economic or business perspective 
MNEs operate as integrated firms, but from a legal perspective they often consist of 
hundreds of separately incorporated companies formed in various countries. In the 
calculation of corporate tax, a company’s revenue is based on its sales, which are assumed 
to be set at the current market price. Legally allowable expenditure is deducted to calculate 
taxable profit. However, this assumption does not hold when sales are to related companies 
that are part of the same corporate group. This also applies to other transactions between 
related parties, such as interest on loans, fees for services, or royalties for intellectual 
property rights. Since these additional payments are usually deductible before calculation of 
tax, they reduce taxable profits. 
 
International tax rules have, from their beginning, given powers to revenue authorities to 
adjust the accounts of associated enterprises within a multinational corporate group. 
However, these rules have been ambivalent (Picciotto 2017a). While powers to adjust are 
granted in cases where related parties are not independent of one another, the principle to 
be applied is that their income should reflect what it would have been if they were 
independent. The application and enforcement of this rule has come under increasing global 
scrutiny and criticism as being unenforceable, and unfavourable for developing countries. As 
a result, the G20/OECD have been working on reforming the rules under the base erosion 
and profit shifting (BEPS) project. It is intended that BEPS Actions 8-10 will introduce 
considerable changes to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, and Action 13 introduces 
new standard templates for transfer pricing documentation and country-by-country reporting 
(OECD 2010, 2015a, 2015b). 
 
In Africa, awareness of the issues surrounding transfer pricing is varied. Although this issue 
has a long history, it is only relatively recently that revenue authorities have begun to apply it 
in a systematic way. In the past, revenue collectors have rarely audited, investigated and 
successfully collected taxes by the application of transfer pricing rules. In 2015 the African 
Union (AU) and United Nations Economic Commission of Africa (UNECA) listed only three 
African countries – Kenya, South Africa and Uganda – as having separate transfer pricing 
units within their revenue collection agencies (AU/UNECA 2015). However, by early 2016 the 
Natural Resource Governance Institute added Tanzania, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia and 
Angola, and stated that Guinea and Sierra Leone are in the process of setting them up 
                                                 
1  Transfer mispricing expresses itself in six ways: (i) intentional falsification of information; (ii) non-declaration of financial 
assets; (iii) trade mispricing; (iv) accounting fraud; (v) bribing tax officials; and (vi) abuse of tax incentives by falsely 
claiming eligibility.  
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(Readhead 2016: 19). As a result currently there are only eight TP units, with an additional 
two being set up, out of the fifty-four African countries. While initial concerns about the 
difficulty in enforcing TP rules were partially resolved by building capacity and training TP 
staff within a TP unit in revenue agencies, the development of these units now allows 
reflection on the effectiveness of a trained TP Unit. A second and more important concern 
should also be addressed: whether the TP rules themselves are suitable or appropriate in a 
developing country context. This paper tests their suitability for Kenya, which has been 
actively building its TP capacity and revising its laws, regulation and policies in order to 
effectively audit transactions on the basis of the OECD TP rules. 
 
Section 1 sets out the background to Kenya, its position in the African continent and globally, 
explaining why it has been selected as a case study. Section 2 sets out the historical 
experience of Kenya, both in developing its TP laws, regulations and procedures, as well as 
building capacity of its staff on issues of transfer pricing. Sections 3 and 4 reflect on the 
Kenyan position as set out in Section 2, and the appropriateness of some of the changes 
being proposed internationally by Actions 8-10 and 13 of the BEPS project of the 
G20/OECD. This paper attempts to unpack the issues surrounding TP in a developing 
country like Kenya, and to reflect on what is really needed in the BEPS process to make it 
usable in developing countries. Sections 5 and 6 give recommendations and conclusions. 
 
 
1  Taxing MNEs and transfer pricing in Kenya 
 
Kenya is probably one of the most interesting countries in the developing world and in Africa 
to study for both international tax purposes and transfer pricing. There are several reasons.  
 
First, Kenya has an active international trade and investment network with many countries. 
The investment network is illustrated graphically in Figure 1, which shows inflows and 
outflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment based on IMF data as at 
2012. The main countries from which these investments flow are: the UK, Mauritius, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, South Africa, United States, Switzerland, Germany, 
Turkey, Italy, India, Denmark, Republic of Korea, Brazil, Norway and Russia. 
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Figure 1 Direct and portfolio investments – inward and outward investment 
 (IDI derived data only)2 
  
Source: STEAL (Douglas 2015)3  
 
Kenya also has ten active double taxation agreements (DTAs), as shown in Table 1. Not all 
Kenya’s DTAs are with the major investing partners: there is no DTA with the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, United States, Switzerland, Republic of Korea, Brazil or Russia. There also 
seems to be no correlation with Kenya’s main trading partners, which include Saudi Arabia, 
Japan, United States, Pakistan and Egypt (KNBS 2014).4 Many African countries have either 
no DTAs or only one DTA, usually with its former colonising state. Few have more than ten. 
The major exceptions are Mauritius, which has forty-three DTAs, with others under 
negotiation, and South Africa, which has over eighty. 
 
Table 1 Kenya’s international tax treaties 
Year Country  
 
Status 
Date of 
signature 
Ratification  
Legal notice no. 
Comments 
1970 Zambia 27.8.1968  10/1970* DTA in force 
1973 Norway 13.12.1972 6/1973* DTA in force 
 Denmark 13.12.1972 5/1973* DTA in force 
 Sweden 28.6.1973  14/1973* DTA in force 
1977 UK 31.7.1973  253/1977* DTA in force 
1980 Germany 17.5.1977  20/1980* DTA in force 
1987 Canada 27.4.1983  111/1987 DTA in force 
                                                 
2  Inward direct investments derived means this data does not actually exist but are economic estimates. 
3  See note 1. 
4  Kenya’s other trading partners include Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Egypt, South Africa, European Union (EU), 
United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Japan, Pakistan and India. 
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1989 India 12.4.1985  61/1989 DTA in force 
2009 France  140/2009 DTA in force 
2016 Italy  3.3.2016  DTA in force 
2016 South Africa 26.11.2010 141/2014 DTA in force 
 EAC   142/2014 DTA signed, not in force 
(signed: Kenya and Rwanda) 
 Iran   Legal Notice No. 60/2014 DTA signed, not in force 
 (awaiting ratification in Iran) 
 Kuwait  Legal Notice No. 149/2014 DTA signed, not in force 
 Mauritius  Legal Notice No. 59/2014 DTA signed, not in force 
 Seychelles  Legal Notice No. 9/2015 DTA signed, not in force 
 Thailand   DTA under negotiation 
 Ethiopia   DTA under negotiation 
 Turkey   DTA under negotiation 
 Qatar   DTA in discussion  
 Nigeria   DTA in discussion 
 Finland   DTA in discussion 
 Russia   DTA in discussion 
 UAE   DTA in discussion 
 Isle of Man    TIEA signed but not ratified 
 Bermuda    TIEA signed but not ratified 
 Liechtenstein    TIEA signed but not ratified 
 Cayman 
Island  
  TIEA signed but not ratified 
 Malta    TIEA signed but not ratified 
 Jersey    TIEA signed but not ratified 
 Monaco    TIEA signed but not ratified 
 Guernsey   TIEA signed but not ratified 
Key: DTA = double tax agreement;  
        TIEA = tax information exchange agreement 
        * = DTA existed before independence and was renegotiated after independence 
Source: KRA (2016); Chege (2013); Tax Wise Consulting (2016) 
 
Kenya also has bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in force with France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK, and BITs signed but not in force with Burundi, China, 
Finland, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritius, Slovakia and Turkey. These treaties, while not tax 
treaties, include non-discrimination and fair treatment obligations that can affect a wide range 
of domestic regulatory powers, including tax (Picciotto 2016). Negotiation of these treaties is 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance, while a prior discussion takes place in the Task 
Force on Double Taxation and Investment Agreements. The Task Force is chaired by the 
Ministry of Finance, and includes members of the policy unit of the Kenya Revenue Authority 
(KRA). It is unclear how much weight is given to tax revenue considerations in the 
negotiations. 
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Second, Kenya forms part of the East African Community (EAC), and borders several 
landlocked countries.5 It is one of the few relatively peaceful countries in the region, but has 
several conflict-prone neighbours.6 Therefore it is important regionally as a source of goods 
and services for the regional economy. The signing of the EAC-COMESA-SADC Tripartite 
Agreement in June 2015 has increased the market access of businesses based in Kenya 
from 40 million Kenyans and 140 million East Africans, to 600 million people, as shown in 
Figure 2 and Table 2 below (EAC 2016). 
 
Figure 2 Geographical coverage of the EAC-COMESA-SADC region 
 
 
Source: EAC 2016  
 
  
                                                 
5  Uganda and South Sudan, whose neighbours include Rwanda and Burundi. 
6  South Sudan, Somalia and nearby Burundi. 
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Table 2 Population and GDP of the SADC-EAC-COMESA region 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2006 
 
Third, Kenya was among the first countries in Africa to try to strengthen its enforcement of 
international taxation, including transfer pricing rules. Even before the creation of the Kenya 
Revenue Authority in 1995, the revenue office under the Ministry of Finance and Treasury 
was divided into four departments called districts. District 4 focused on corporate income tax, 
and included a special unit focusing on MNEs.7 Work of this special unit resulted in the audit 
of Netherlands-owned Unilever, and subsequent litigation in the High Court of Kenya 
(Unilever v The Commissioner General, KRA 2005). Since 2011 the KRA has been involved 
in litigation with the Indian-owned flower exporter Karuturi, which as at January 2017 was still 
unresolved (Karuturi Limited v Commissioner of Domestic Taxes, undecided). These are the 
only TP cases to have reached the courts in Eastern and Central Africa, and are discussed in 
more detail in Section 2. Despite efforts to monitor and prevent transfer mispricing, it remains 
unclear whether they have resulted in a significant and consistent increase in government 
revenue. The data on income tax revenue from corporations between 2005 and 2014 set out 
in Table 3 and Figure 3 below shows increased collections. However, the reasons for this 
growth remain unclear, and will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.4. 
 
  
                                                 
7  Interview 11. 
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Table 3 Corporate tax revenue 2005-20148 
 
 
Source: derived from KRA (2016); Prichard et al. (2014) 
 
Fourth, Kenya is a developing country that achieved middle-income country status in 2015. 
This was done through re-analysis of data and rebasing of its economy, which resulted in 
increasing nominal gross domestic product by 25 per cent to $55 billion (World Bank 2016). 
A reflection on Kenya’s challenges over the past eighteen years may provide options for both 
developing and developed countries to consider as they decide how to approach cross-
border issues, including international tax and transfer pricing. Kenya has the largest 
economy in East Africa, ninth in Africa, and the fourth largest in sub-Saharan Africa, after 
Nigeria, South Africa and Angola. Kenya was listed as the second most preferred destination 
for MNEs in Africa by the Frontier Strategy Group, coming after Nigeria (Gachiri 2014), and 
fifth by Mail and Guardian Africa (M & G Africa 2015). 
 
Fifth, Kenya is in an unusual position as an African country that not only hosts foreign 
multinationals and often their regional hubs (Kelley 2011),9 but also has its own large home-
grown multinationals, as set out in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 Large MNEs with headquarters in Kenya 
 MNE Countries 
of 
presence  
Sector Turnover 
(2011) (US$) 
Companies above/below 
€750,000 million annual 
turnover  
1.  Kenol/Kobil Kenya, 
Uganda 
Petroleum 1,221,130 Above 
2.  Safaricom  Telecom 1,379,876 Above 
3.  Kenya Airways  Transport 1,030,321 Above 
4.  Kenya Power  Telecom 878,002 Above 
5.  Total Kenya  Petroleum 772,342 Above 
6.  East African 
Breweries 
(Group) 
Kenya, 
Uganda 
Commodity 455,5844 Below 
                                                 
8  Data on income tax from corporations in Kenya includes tax on income, profits and capital gains. 
9  These include Google, Visa, MasterCard, KFC, Pepsi, Travelport and Dow Chemicals, which have chosen Nairobi for 
either their regional or African headquarters.  
0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000
2005/6
2006/7
2007/8
2008/9
2009/10* Estimates
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13* Provisional
2013/14** Estimates
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7.  East African 
Breweries 
(Kenya) 
 Commodity 414,780 Below 
8.  Bamburi 
Cement 
 Construction 336,900 Below 
9.  Nakumatt Rwanda, 
Uganda, 
Tanzania 
Commodity 
(retail) 
 
334,358 Below 
Source: extracted from IGD & DGDA (2011) 
 
Other African countries with MNEs having an annual turnover higher than €750 million 
include Nigeria, South Africa, Morocco, Egypt, Libya and Mauritius (IGD and DGDA 2011). 
This makes Kenya one of the select African and developing countries that will not only be a 
receiver of information, but also a provider or sharer of information under new BEPS 
regulations on country-by-country reporting (discussed in more detail in Section 4). Kenya’s 
MNEs operate predominantly within East Africa, and the KRA will have to share data with 
other East African countries, including Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, South Sudan and 
Somalia. 
 
Finally, in several articles and reports being produced on international tax law, Kenya is often 
cited as an African developing country that has been successfully using the OECD transfer 
pricing regulations to increase revenue collection since 2010. Corrick claims that OECD 
training helped the KRA to increase its revenue collection through transfer pricing audits from 
US$52 to US$107 million in 2014 (Corrick 2016: 196). 
 
The following sections look at some key questions. What are the Kenyan transfer pricing 
laws, and how have they developed (Section 2)? Do current OECD transfer pricing rules, 
which are similar to the Kenyan rules, allow states to share revenue appropriately (Section 
3)? Under existing international rules, what steps does a country like Kenya, and its revenue 
authority, need to take in order to effectively collect taxes (Section 4)? 
 
 
2  The development of transfer pricing laws in 
Kenya  
 
While some African countries have no laws in their income tax legislation dealing with issues 
of TP, Kenya is one of the few that has provisions covering issues of cross-border tax dating 
back to the colonial era. This section will set out and analyse Kenya’s attempts to tax cross-
border transactions from before independence up to 2016. 
  
2.1 From colonisation (1886) to independence (1964)  
 
The British Colonial Office tried to implement income tax in its Kenya colony in 1920. This 
was met with stiff opposition, with the result that the 1920 Income Tax Ordinance was 
amended in 1922 to state that not only would no income tax be levied, but anything already 
collected would be refunded (British Colonial Office 1922a). It was replaced as a revenue 
source by import duties on foodstuffs, particularly wheat, sugar and tea (Swainson 1980: 25). 
 
In this period the British Inter-departmental Committee on Income Tax had prepared a 
Colonial Model Income Tax Ordinance for colonies not possessing ‘responsible government’ 
(British Colonial Office 1922b). The Committee dealt with the taxation of profits from cross-
border business in its report to the Colonial Office, and recommended application of the 
approach adopted in the UK. The UK position was that where a non-resident carried on 
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business through an agent resident in the colony, tax should apply on profits gained by 
trading in the Colony but not from trade with the Colony (British Colonial Office 1922b: 42). It 
cited the report of the Royal Commission on Income Taxation (1919-20), which concluded 
that no reasonably short definition could be made of this distinction. As regards 
determination of the level of profit, it recommended against adoption of the rule that had 
been introduced in Trinidad, which provided that where the level of profit could not be easily 
ascertained, a presumption should be applied that it should be 10 per cent of the selling 
price. It preferred instead the UK approach of ‘leaving the taxing authority, in any case where 
the actual profits which the non-resident derives from his trade within the country cannot be 
ascertained, to fix such a fair and reasonable percentage as the facts of the particular case 
may justify’ (British Colonial Office 1922b: 39). The model law put forward a TP provision that 
stated in article 27(2): 
 
Where a non-resident person, not being a British subject, or a firm or company whose 
principal place of business is situated in His Majesty's Dominions or in territory under 
His Majesty's protection, or a branch thereof, carries on business with a resident 
person, and it appears to the Commissioner that owing to the close connection 
between the resident person and the non-resident person and to the substantial 
control exercised by the non-resident person over the resident person, the course of 
business between those persons can be so arranged and is so arranged, that the 
business done by the resident person in pursuance of his connection with the non-
resident person produces to the resident person either no profits or less than the 
ordinary profits which might be expected to arise from that business, the non-resident 
person shall be assessable and chargeable to tax in the name of the resident person 
as if the resident person were an agent of the non-resident person. 
 
This is very similar to Section 31(3) of the 1915 Finance Act of the UK, and even today 
similar forms of this provision are found in former British colonies, such as Jamaica.  
 
Income tax was finally introduced in the Kenya colony in 1933, with a change of both the 
governorship of the colony and a power shift away from the Kenyan Legislative Council and 
towards the Colonial Office in the UK (Dilley 1966). In 1937 an income tax law finally passed 
the Kenyan Legislative Council (Income Tax Ordinance 1937). The Ordinance included an 
identical TP provision at article 27(2) to the one set out in the 1922 model ordinance cited 
above. 
 
The 1922 Ordinance also included a general anti-avoidance provision (GAAP) – Section 22b 
– which stated: ‘where the assessing officer is of the opinion that any transaction which 
reduces or would reduce the amount of tax payable by any person is artificial or fictitious or 
that any disposition is in fact not given effect to, he may disregard any such transaction or 
disposition and the person concerned would be assessable accordingly’. 
  
This GAAP is believed to have originated from the English Excess Profit Duty legislation of 
1915, which mentioned fictitious or artificial transactions. The Kenya Income Tax Ordinance 
was revised in 1940, but maintained a similar GAAP provision as section 23 (Kenya Colony 
1940a; Kenya Colony 1940b). There is no reported case law within this period, and the 
provision remained untested. 
 
In 1952 the three ordinances governing income tax (Kenya Colony 1940a; Kenya Colony 
1940b; Kenya Colony 1941) were combined into the East African Income Tax (Management) 
Act 1952. In addition to including the already-mentioned TP and GAAP provisions, section 
16(2)(j) set out thin capitalisation rules, disallowing deduction of interest for companies other 
than banks if loans exceeded three times the equity of the company, where it is in the control 
of a non-resident person, alone or together with four or fewer other persons.  
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The TP provision in the East Africa Tax Management Act 1952 at section 4 provided:  
 
Where an enterprise of one of the territories participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other territory, or the same 
person participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an 
enterprise of one of the territories and the enterprise of the other territory, and in 
either case, conditions are either made or imposed between the two enterprises, in 
their commercial or financial relations, which differ from those of which would be 
made between independent enterprises, any profit which would but for those 
conditions have accrued to one of the enterprises but by reason of those conditions 
have not so accrued may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed 
accordingly. 
 
This text essentially reproduces article 9 of the model tax treaties, but differs significantly 
from the TP provision introduced in the UK the previous year (Finance Act 1951, s.37). 
However, there does not appear to be any published instance of the application of this 
provision, and no reported transfer pricing cases before independence, although the Act of 
1952 remained in place until independence in 1964 and included sections 4 (which replaced 
section 27(2) – the TP provision set out earlier) and section 22 (the GAAP). As a result, at 
independence there was a TP provision, a GAAP and a thin capitalisation rule. 
 
2.2 The post-independence period (1964 to 1998) 
 
As part of the transition to independence all existing legislation remained in place, as well as 
any UK international agreements that had been extended to Kenya. In addition, the three 
East African states (Kenya, Tanganyika/Tanzania and Uganda) continued to be part of the 
East African Community (EAC), and the East African Tax Management Act remained in force 
until 1970 when the EAC was dissolved. Kenya renegotiated the existing six DTAs (set out in 
Table 1 above) that were negotiated before independence, although no changes were made 
to the text of the treaties. Upon the dissolution of the EAC in 1970, Kenya re-enacted the 
1940 Kenya Income Tax Ordinance as the Income Tax Act of 1970, maintaining most of the 
same provisions but without reference to the Crown. As a result, section 23 of the Kenya 
Income Tax Act remained in force as the GAAP. The transfer pricing provision was similarly 
adopted by using the 1940 version of section 27(2) set out above, but re-numbered as 
Section 18(3). The TP provision in section 18(3) states that:  
 
(3) Where a non-resident person carries on business with a related resident person 
and the course of that business is so arranged that it produces to the resident person 
either no profits or less than the ordinary profits which might be expected to accrue 
from that business if there had been no such relationship, then the gains or profits of 
that resident person shall be deemed to be the amount that might have been expected 
to accrue if the course of that business had been conducted by independent persons 
dealing at arm’s length. 
 
This provision is similar to one found in many Commonwealth countries, including Jamaica 
and the Solomon Islands. It is clearly aimed at an arrangement between a resident and non-
resident person that results in little or no profit, which today is commonly referred to as base 
erosion and profit shifting. However, the true intent and spirit of the legislation is not clear – 
whether to ensure a balance in the attribution of profits, or to act as an anti-avoidance rule. 
 
There was neither case law nor legislative reform regarding the enforcement of cross-border 
tax issues after independence up to 1998. The elaboration of procedures by issuance of 
additional regulations was left as a power of the minister of finance under section 18, but was 
never acted upon. The Revenue Office, then still under the Ministry of Finance, undertook a 
Tax Modernisation Programme in 1986, and in 1995 the KRA was established as a semi-
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autonomous corporate entity (Moyi and Ronge 2006). This led to the setting up of a separate 
unit for the audit of MNEs under the corporate income tax department. The Taxpayers’ Office 
was divided into four districts. District 4 dealt only with corporate income tax, and housed a 
special unit that focused solely on MNEs.  
 
2.3 The Unilever case and its effect on TP law and practice (1998-2012) 
 
By 1998, there were only six DTAs in force in Kenya.10 The only relevant legal provision on 
international tax and transfer pricing at the time were sections 16, 18 and 23 of the Income 
Tax Act, cited above, with no regulations for its procedural application. Between 
independence and 2000, the Institute of Certified Accountants of Kenya developed the 
Kenyan Accounting Standards as guidelines for accounting of cross-border transactions. 
However, these were being replaced on a piecemeal basis by the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) by the late 1990s. Kenya had been applying the IAS since 2000, and as a 
result the TP regulations (Appendix C) were tied in with IAS no 24 (IASB 2012).11 The 
objective of this Standard is to ensure that the financial statements of an entity contain the 
information necessary to demonstrate that the financial position as the result of the exercise 
has not been affected by the existence of related parties and of transactions conducted with 
them (IASB 2012; Income Tax Act 2012). 
 
The TP provision in section 18(3) remained untested until a routine audit in 1998 by the 
special unit focusing on MNEs. A member of the special unit who had been allocated to audit 
Unilever noticed a discrepancy in the prices of goods manufactured by Unilever (Kenya), but 
sold in Uganda by Unilever (Uganda). Unilever (Kenya) was manufacturing washing powder 
and toothpaste and transferring them to Unilever (Uganda) for sale in Uganda under a 
contract of 1995. Unilever (Kenya) also manufactured and sold such products to customers 
in Kenya, and to other unrelated customers in the export market. The audit found that 
Unilever (Kenya) charged lower prices to Unilever (Uganda) than those charged both to 
customers in Kenya and to unrelated parties in the export market both in Uganda and 
elsewhere (Unilever v The Commissioner General, KRA 2005: 2). 
 
Applying the principle of comparability, the price charged to a related party should be 
benchmarked with the price charged to third parties, taking into account the circumstances of 
the case. The KRA proposed an adjustment of profits based on local comparables, after 
adjusting for transport costs. In effect this applied the Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) 
method outlined in the 1995 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. However, the KRA did not 
refer explicitly to the CUP. Unilever claimed that they approached the comparability issue 
using the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, since section 18(3) was insufficiently specific. 
Unilever argued that the CUP was unsuitable, since the sales to unrelated parties referred to 
by the KRA were not actually comparable. It cited several reasons, including the different mix 
of products involved, as well as the costs of marketing in Kenya (Unilever v The 
Commissioner General, KRA 2005:6). Instead of using the CUP, Unilever (Kenya) had 
therefore used the cost plus method, as accepted in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.  
 
The KRA set up a transfer pricing unit in 2000, after the Commissioner General of taxation 
directed his staff to provide additional audit support for the Unilever case.12 This was the only 
case that the TP unit was examining at that point in time, and five members of staff were 
                                                 
10  Zambia, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, UK and Germany; these did not include the Netherlands (headquarters of 
Unilever), or Uganda. 
11  This standard applies to: (a) identification of relationships and transactions between related parties; (b) identifying 
outstanding balances between an entity and its related parties; (c) identification of circumstances that requires 
disclosure about (a) and (b) above, and (d) the determination to disclose information on these headings. It requires 
disclosure of related party transactions and outstanding balances with them in the separate financial statements of a 
dominant participant in a joint venture or an investor, prepared in accordance with IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate 
Financial Statements. 
12  Interview 2. 
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allocated to the case.13 KRA proceeded to conduct an in-depth audit followed by protracted 
negotiations, but failed to come to an agreed outcome with Unilever. This led to an appeal to 
the Local Committee which the KRA won, and, finally, an appeal to the High Court of Kenya 
by Unilever. In arguing the application of section 18(3), the KRA stated that Unilever (Kenya) 
was simply giving a discount to their related company in Uganda, and the Local Committee 
upheld this argument. However, the Local Committee did not give reasons for their decision, 
and as result the High Court decided to reconsider the entire case.  
 
In 2004 the High Court decided in favour of Unilever, based on two main limbs. First, that 
there were no regulations under section 18(3), and as a result the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines would be applied; second, that the section was itself unclear, placing burden of 
proof on the Commissioner General and not the taxpayer. 
 
On the first limb, the KRA argued that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines did not apply, 
since they were not referred to anywhere in Kenyan law, and, in any case, had no more than 
advisory status. This was rejected in a remarkable decision by Justice Visram, who opined: 
‘We live in what is now referred to as a “global village”. We cannot overlook or side line what 
has come out of the wisdom of taxpayers or tax collectors in other countries. And, especially 
because of the absence of any such guidelines in Kenya, we must look elsewhere’ (Unilever 
v The Commissioner General; KRA 2005:13). 
 
The decision rested on the view that the burden was on the KRA to justify the adjustment it 
had made. Although the KRA could do this in principle by referring to the CUP, which was 
the method preferred by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, it failed to rebut the data 
provided by Unilever regarding lack of comparable data. This can be attributed to lack of 
experience at the time of applying these rules of both the KRA audit staff and the Local 
Committee, and it could be argued both the lawyer litigating the case and the High Court 
judge who heard the case. Since Kenya is not a member of the OECD, this decision in effect 
bound Kenya to the recommendations of an organisation it was not part of, and to the 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines it was not involved in formulating and had never assented to. 
There was also no mention of the UN Guidelines as an alternative for the judge to consider. 
 
The transfer pricing unit that had been set up during the case was disbanded after the 
judge’s decision, as the view at the KRA was that it was too difficult to collect any revenue 
through transfer pricing. Since staff were working on – and rewarded according to 
achievement of – tax collection targets, the problems with transfer pricing meant that KRA 
staff were unwilling to be located in the transfer pricing unit. Pending cases were settled or 
dropped. In Sara Lee Household & Body Care Limited v KRA, an appeal pending in the High 
Court, where it was evident that the appellant would rely heavily on the Unilever decision, the 
Commissioner and the appellant negotiated an out-of-court settlement. Other cases were 
dropped without recovery of any taxes (Chege 2013). 
 
Two legal changes took place, almost as though the KRA wanted to start again with a clean 
slate. First, section 18 was amended in line with the judge’s decision, and second the 
Commissioner General issued regulations under section 18(3). Following the ruling in 2005, 
Kenya issued the Income Tax (Transfer Pricing Rules) 2006 to guide the application of 
Section 18(3) of the Income Tax Act. It is unclear who drafted these regulations or whether 
there was any external advice involved in the drafting, but they essentially followed the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Rule 4 specifies that ‘The taxpayer may choose a 
method to employ in determining the arm’s length price from among the methods set out in 
rule 7’, while rule 7 states:  
 
  
                                                 
13  Interview 3 
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‘7. Methods. 
The methods referred to in rule 4 are the following– 
(a) the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method, in which the transfer price in a 
controlled transaction is compared with the prices in an uncontrolled transaction and 
accurate adjustments made to eliminate material price differences; 
(b) the resale price method, in which the transfer price of the produce is compared with 
the resale price at which the product is sold to an independent enterprise; 
Provided that in the application of this method the resale price shall be reduced by the 
resale price margin (the profit margin indicated by the reseller); 
(c) the cost plus method, in which costs are assessed using the costs incurred by the 
supplier of a product in a controlled transaction, with a mark-up added to make an 
appropriate profit in light of the functions performed, and the assets used and risks 
assumed by the supplier; 
(d) the profit split method, in which the profits earned in very closely interrelated 
controlled transactions are split among the related enterprises depending on the 
functions performed by each enterprise in relation to the transaction, and compared 
with a profit split among independent enterprises in a joint venture; 
(e) the transactional net margin method, in which the net profit margin attained by a 
multinational enterprise in a controlled transaction is compared to the net profit margin 
that would have been earned in comparable transactions by an independent 
enterprise; and  
(f) such other method as may be prescribed by the Commissioner from time to time, 
where in his opinion and in view of the nature of the transactions, the arm’s length price 
cannot be determined using any of the methods contained in these guidelines’. 
 
The rules also gave the Commissioner General the power to require taxpayers to supply 
documentation justifying the choice of transfer pricing methods, including information about 
‘the global organisation structure of the enterprise’. 
 
The second limb identified by the judge was the ambiguity in section 18(3). In 2010 Section 
18(3) of the Income Tax Act was amended, by deleting ‘so arranged’ and substituting ‘such’ 
(Income Tax Act 2010: section 24). 
 
The new version of section 18(3) now reads  
 
(3) Where a non-resident person carries on business with a related resident person 
and the course of that business is such [italics added] that it produces to the resident 
person either no profits or less than the ordinary profits which might be expected to 
accrue from that business if there had been no such relationship, then the gains or 
profits of that resident person shall be deemed to be the amount that might have been 
expected to accrue if the course of that business had been conducted by independent 
persons dealing at arm’s length. 
 
This change was because the phrase ‘so arranged’, according to J. Visram in the Unilever 
case, suggested the presence of intention or a premeditated act which the Commissioner 
has to prove to sustain an assessment. The amendment aimed to lower the standard of proof 
required if the Commissioner is to make a transfer pricing adjustment. Under the revised 
provision, the Commissioner is only required to demonstrate that as a result of the 
commercial arrangement the transaction gave rise to less than normal tax, lowering the level 
of the burden of proof for the KRA. A further change expanded the definition of related party 
as applied to individuals to include relation by blood (consanguinity) and other close 
relationships (affinity) by amending section 18(6) (c). This recognised that much business in 
Kenya is carried out by individuals and families, rather than companies.  
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At the regional level, the African Revenue Authority Commissioner Generals, of which Kenya 
was a founding member, created the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) in 2008. Its 
mandate included issues of cross-border taxation (ATAF 2016). Global concern, highlighted 
by organisations such as the Tax Justice Network, resulted in the beginning of a process of 
review of international taxation rules in 2009.14 The OECD set up the Tax and Development 
Task Force in 2009, and one of the most immediate results was agreement at the OECD that 
revenue authorities in developing countries were desperately in need of capacity building in 
issues of transfer pricing. Kenya was one of the first beneficiaries of this decision, in light of 
the Unilever case and its efforts to apply transfer pricing rules.15 The OECD also set up the 
Global Forum in 2011.   
 
As part of the capacity-building programme, in 2011 the KRA created two teams of five 
people, both under a supervisor, to begin to audit MNEs. In the same year KRA purchased 
access to the Amadeus system, which gave some data on comparables, and audits began to 
take a different shape. In 2012 an amendment of rule 8 of the Transfer Pricing Rules 2006 
empowered the Commissioner to issue guidelines specifying conditions and procedures for 
the application of the methods set out in rule 7. This was a response to the problems 
encountered in administration of arm’s length principle. The Commissioner General could 
now issue guidelines and revise them whenever necessary. To enable the KRA to easily 
identify taxpayers with related party transactions, the taxpayer‘s annual income tax return 
was redesigned to facilitate disclosure of details of related party transactions. The related 
party information that is required to be disclosed under the 2012 regulations includes: loans 
advanced or received, sales and/or purchases, payment or receipt for services, intellectual 
property, head office expenses and payment towards cost contribution arrangements. These 
changes were made effective from 2012 using the Integrated Tax Management System (now 
iTax). Taxpayers engaged in related party transactions are identified, and the accounting 
ratios that show where a company is making more or less profit than its industry-specific 
counterparts are computed. This identifies taxpayers with transactions that are prima facie 
deemed non-compliant with the arm’s length principle. The selected taxpayers are then 
subjected to further screening and, if found wanting, are subjected to a transfer pricing tax 
audit. It was in this period that the audit of Karuturi began. This is discussed in detail in the 
next section, which also highlights the current position of the KRA TP unit. 
 
2.4 The Karuturi case and current practice (2012-2016) 
 
The KRA TP team began auditing related party transactions under the revised regulations 
between 2010 and 2012. An audit of Sher Karuturi, an Indian-owned agricultural company 
with operations in the United Arab Emirates, revealed transfer mispricing. Available 
information is mainly from press releases, since the case remains unresolved. This is 
discussed here as it has been the main controversy in this period.  
 
On 4 April 2013 Sher Karuturi (an Indian MNE) filed a notice of appeal against the decision of 
the Tax Tribunal for taxes due. The process of audit and negotiation had been ongoing for 
several years. According to the Indian Credit Rating Research Agency in an October 2012 
analysis commissioned by Karuturi, as well as Karuturi’s 2012 annual report, Karuturi 
registered a tax dispute with the KRA over transfer pricing involving KSh975 million (US$10.7 
million/€8 million). This was almost 1 per cent of Kenya’s total tax collection in 2012. Since 
then newspaper reports suggest that the case went back into negotiation without any actual 
presentation of the facts in court, and the last report was that Karuturi had negotiated the 
                                                 
14  Interview 4. This interviewee credited civil society organisations especially for the debates surrounding country-by-
country reporting (CbCR), pointed out that these rules were already being applied in the mining and telecom sectors, 
and that MNEs must get used to being more transparent. 
15  Interview 9.  
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figure down to US$40,000. Karuturi (Kenya) has been under intense criticism since 2013, 
and is now in receivership. 
 
In making the TP assessment of Karuturi it seems that the KRA applied the comparable 
uncontrolled price (CUP) method. Under CUP, the transaction between related parties is 
compared to a transaction of the same goods in the same market under similar conditions 
between unrelated parties. The Karuturi case involved the export of roses to overseas 
markets through Flower Express, a related party situated in Dubai. Flower Express would 
buy all flowers produced by Karuturi on ‘free-on-board Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, 
Nairobi’ terms. Before the flowers left Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, some of the 
flowers were sold to third-party exporters at a significantly higher price; they then exported 
the flowers to Europe and other markets served by Flower Express. The price charged by 
Flower Express to third-party exporters was used by the KRA as an internal comparable for 
CUP, and the price between Karuturi and Flower Express was adjusted appropriately. 
Although the details of the case itself remain outside the public domain, press reports 
suggest that subsequent negotiations resulted in a reduction of the tax bill from Ksh2 billion 
to Ksh500 million (approx. US$200 million to US$50 million). This case contributed to public 
controversy around tax evasion by MNEs in Kenya. Perhaps as a result, the Kenyan 
company was placed into receivership in April-May 2016, although it was reported that its 
main assets (land and some agricultural equipment) were owned by its sister companies 
(Muchiri 2016). Despite the limited information available, the KRA continues to stand by the 
audit and assessment of its TP unit. 
 
Despite the failure to conclude the Karuturi case, it was reported that three other major audits 
resulted in companies accepting the adjustments, and paying the amounts specified.16 This 
may have been a result of the risk of possible reputational damage, as seen in the example 
of the Karuturi case. However, since the names of the companies and details of the cases 
are unknown, it remains unclear whether and how the companies in question modified their 
previous declarations. This payment may have contributed to the increased revenue 
collection of US$1 million in 2013, when KRA surpassed its annual target as seen in Figure 5 
below.17  
 
Table 5 compares actual taxes collected from corporation tax to KRA’s total tax collection 
targets between 2005 and 2015. There are two problems with the figures: first, corporate tax 
collection targets are not publicly available; second, corporation tax figures shown include 
capital gains tax. The latter figure is likely to be very small, as capital gains tax was only re-
introduced in 2014. The data in Table 5 is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the share of 
corporate tax compared to total tax collection. 
 
  
                                                 
16  Interview 11. 
17  Interview 8. 
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Table 5 Tax collection 2005/6 to 2014/15 (millions of US$) 
Fiscal Year Corporate tax 
collected 
Total tax target  Total tax 
collected 
 
Percentage 
change from 
previous year 
2005/6 54,144   309,416  
2006/7 61,144  371,989 +17% 
2007/8 79,125  441,530 +16% 
2008/9 85,844  502,096 +12% 
2009/10 103,655  577,253 +13% 
2010/11 97,972 641,200 542,945 -6% 
2011/12 127,995 733,400 651,410 +17% 
2012/13 154,134 881,000 725,521 +10% 
2013/14 170,917 973,500 830,319 +13% 
2014/15 208,002 1,180,000 1,006,862 +18% 
Source: Author, derived from ICTD database; tax targets from KRA website; no inflation adjustment 
 
Figure 3 Tax collection, 2005/6 to 2014/15 (from Table 3) 
 
* 2013-2015 figures remain provisional and estimates only due to the failure of the Auditor General to publicly release reports 
Source: Author, derived from the ICTD and KRA Database 
 
Figure 3 shows that taxes overall, as well as corporate tax, are growing. There is, therefore, 
a possible correlation between the capacity of KRA to understand and implement TP rules, 
and the increase in collection. Table 5 above shows that apart from 2013/2014 fiscal year, 
over the past four years KRA has revised its targets downwards repeatedly in the course of 
the year, and failed to reach the projected target despite increasing collection (BD Reporter 
2014).  
 
There were two other legislative changes enacted in 2013 and 2014 to tighten the TP 
framework. First, in recognition of increasing cases of transfer mispricing in relation to value 
added tax (VAT), the Value Added Tax Act, 2013 was amended to ensure that prices applied 
between related parties are at arm’s length. Section 13(1) (b) requires that, in determining 
the value of a supply in the case of related parties, the price shall be the open market value. 
The open market value is a similar concept to the arm’s length price. Subsection 8 defines a 
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related person as a person or third party who participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of the business.  
 
Second, a regulation was enacted under section 18(3) of the Income Tax Act in 2014, 
allowing for the issue of advance pricing agreements (APAs).18 In addition, section 30 of the 
Tax Procedure Act (2015) allows for the issue of advance assessments, which could be an 
alternative route to follow. However, these procedures have not yet been utilised, arguably 
because the KRA is not ready to issue either document yet, as it does not have sector-wide 
information.19 In addition, the KRA does not have the capacity to verify whether companies 
comply with an APA. APAs are perceived as part of co-operative compliance, and the KRA 
Investigation Department has been receiving training from the Swedish Tax Agency and 
Italian Revenue on its implementation of co-operative compliance.20 Finally, sections 62-69 
of the Tax Procedure Act (2015) grant the Commissioner General the power to issue public 
and private rulings through a diverse palate of potential issues, including and not limited to 
individual transactions.21 
 
In conclusion, one can see that Kenya has grappled with the problems of assessing and 
auditing TP transactions for over a decade. Some progress has been made, although the 
process has been neither smooth nor easy. Section 3 looks in detail at the challenges and 
successes of KRA in understanding and implementing TP rules in its audits and 
assessments, and proposes solutions.  
 
 
3  Current TP challenges and successes  
 
Kenya has come a long way since the Unilever case, when staff were mostly untrained in TP 
and there were no TP regulations or comparables. The KRA now has teams of trained staff 
who collect taxes based on strengthened TP regulations, using a comparables database. 
Kenya’s historical background, outlined in Section 2, allows reflection on and analysis on the 
effects of the process of reforms and capacity building under current OECD TP rules. The 
findings here are broken down into: legal framework, capacity, audit process, governance 
and technical obstacles.  
 
3.1 Legislative framework 
 
The Unilever case showed that the judge found the law insufficient. Since case law forms 
precedent, the Unilever case has adversely affected TP collection.22 All similar cases have 
had to be abandoned until legislation has been amended. It is important that that the judiciary 
and Tax Appeal Tribunal call upon independent experts to assist them in understanding 
technical issues. 
 
Although many reforms are now in place, there are not enough. Identified concerns include: 
lack of clarity on where in the KRA to file TP policy that is submitted with the self-assessment 
form; no prescribed forms to fill in; no prescribed database to assist in choice of method and 
its application; and no guidance on the method selected.  
 
                                                 
18  An APA is an ahead-of-time agreement between a taxpayer and a tax authority on an appropriate transfer pricing 
methodology for a set of transactions at issue over a fixed period of time (called covered transactions) (Legal IQ 2017). 
19  Interview 9. 
20  Interview 11 and 12. 
21  A tax ruling in Kenya is a decision made by the Commissioner General and is a decision or opinion of the revenue 
authority in respect of actual situations. It comes in advance before the fact as part of an assessment procedure or in 
response to taxpayer questions. 
22  Interview 9.  
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In addition, as issues surrounding TP have been in flux since the development of the OECD 
BEPS project, the legal and policy unit needs to be constantly prepared to provide 
amendments to law and policy for the Ministry of Finance to present to parliament as well as 
to issue regulations – similar to the Davis Tax Committee in South Africa. However, the 
government of Kenya does not seem to be considering this.  
 
3.2 Capacity 
 
The process of a TP audit is conducted only by the twelve-member TP unit (which falls under 
the Large Taxpayers Office (LTO)). No other department in the KRA looks into this issue. 
The current unit is divided into two teams of five members, with a sixth member as 
supervisor. As it is still a very new unit, they only have between two-three years of training, 
and five-six years of experience, and have only received basic TP training. Training is 
currently being provided by the OECD, IMF, Commonwealth Association of Tax 
Administrators and ATAF, and predominantly to those in the TP unit, the legal unit, dispute 
resolution unit and policy unit.  
 
It is necessary not just to continue to build and maintain capacity within the KRA, but also 
other parts of government that touch upon it. Public awareness needs to be raised to ensure 
their assistance in improving tax collection.23 
 
On the positive side, the unit has had low staff turnover over the first six years; all trained 
staff were staying within KRA, although a few were reassigned to other KRA departments. 
This recently changed with the promotion of one supervisor to deputy commissioner; the 
departure of the unit’s head to work at the OECD-based Tax Inspectors without Borders in 
early 2016; and one member of the dispute resolution team (who is also a mining tax 
specialist) moving to the Global Policy Centre at the Business and Economics University of 
Vienna. Turnover may become a concern in the next few years, especially once BEPS 
project reforms have been implemented.24 However, staff may not want to leave while they 
can access training and gain practical experience, since this programme is keeping them 
exposed to cutting edge issues.  
 
Despite the relative stability of the unit, some tax advisors interviewed consider that five or 
six of the twelve staff in the unit have a good depth of knowledge. The central problem 
remains the need for a deep understanding of specific industry sectors that can be widely 
different – for example, the petroleum industry and foreign exchange trading. As a result, 
despite improved capacity, the audit itself takes on average two to three years, and 
completion of a matter takes four to five years.25 While capacity in the KRA has improved, no 
members of the Tax Appeals Tribunal, judiciary or parliament have received training that 
would allow them to better understand this very complex issue. 
 
3.3 The audit process 
 
There are several ways that a potential transfer mispricing issue is identified at KRA – a tip-
off from a multinational company or media reports, when audit staff notice something during 
a general audit, or through systematic audit of MNEs by staff of the TP unit. 
 
In the first scenario – a tip-off – three tax audit cases were settled after public statements 
made in the press and on the internet were cross-referenced with tax data filed at the KRA.26  
 
                                                 
23  Interview 2. 
24  Interview 11. 
25  Interviews 7 and 8. 
26  Interview 11. 
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In the second scenario, a tax auditor discovering a potential issue of TP, the case is 
immediately forwarded to the TP unit. Since this is a general audit and includes other issues, 
private accountants and auditors interviewed noted that in some cases TP concerns were not 
picked up even at the in-depth audit stage. Instead other simpler tax errors were dealt with 
outside the TP unit, resulting a clean bill of health.27 
 
Under the third scenario, a risk-based approach has been taken by the TP unit. First, 
companies to be audited are identified using several risk indicators from a review of returns 
and transfer pricing documents filed with the KRA. The risk indicators include identifying 
countries that have previously engaged in transfer mispricing. MNEs operating in countries 
known to harbour companies that have evaded taxes in the past are placed under scrutiny.28 
The TP unit also looks for other indicators, including a fall in tax receipts from an industry, a 
drop in the amount of data reported, and differences between actual physical activity and the 
data in the documentation presented for reporting purposes. The procedure followed is to 
audit one company first, and see if there is an issue that may be more widespread – in which 
case the audit will extend to the whole industry. Other markers include looking at VAT returns 
to see who sold to whom, and to check the corresponding company. They also look at news 
reports to identify when a company is showing lower profits – either in comparison with other 
companies, or simply where they have fallen without reason.29 KRA officials are aware that 
‘tax evasion could not take place without the assistance of the Kenyans working within these 
sectors, and that this enabled the system of abuse of the related parties concept’.30 In 
conclusion, it seems that the most effective way to identify targets seems to be through being 
tipped off. Finally, any TP issues identified by other audit teams are forwarded to the TP unit 
for consideration. 
 
After identification of a company, a team of two auditors in the TP unit conduct a basic 
compliance audit. If no TP issues are identified, the company is not pursued further. 
However, if TP issues are identified, the same team goes on to do an in-depth audit. During 
the in-depth audit there are negotiations and discussions within the TP unit on the 
parameters used to make the assessment. This includes calling on key personnel at the 
MNE concerned, either to request additional documentation or to interview them for 
information. The TP unit records such interviews, and a transcript of the meeting is sent to 
the specific interviewee to sign off to confirm the content. Examples of compliance issues 
mentioned by TP unit members interviewed were that those who arrived at the KRA for 
interviews may refuse to sign the transcript, or may request that a part be removed.31 An 
assessment is then issued. If the issues within the assessment are agreed upon by 
negotiation and settled, the matter ends there. However, if the company fails to agree with 
the assessment and negotiations fail, the taxpayer can appeal to the Tax Appeals Tribunal. 
The Investigation Department is only called in for cases of potential criminality.32  
 
Although there was no exact data available on how many cases progress to each stage, it 
seems that most cases are dealt with at the first stage of a basic compliance audit; only 1 per 
cent of cases escalate to an in-depth audit. The in-depth audit team chooses which of the 1 
per cent to proceed with. On average it is able to proceed with less than 10 per cent of them, 
mainly due to limited resources.33 This effectively means that only 0.1 per cent of cases 
result in an in-depth audit. Very few cases go to the Investigation Department, and the 
taxpayer is generally anxious to avoid this stage. 
 
                                                 
27  Interview 5. 
28  Interview 9 and 11. 
29  Interview 6. 
30  Interview 2. 
31  Interview 9. 
32  The investigation unit falls under the department of investigation, and services all parts of KRA - not just the TP unit. 
33  Interview 7. 
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3.4 Governance 
 
Despite the swiftness in joining the Global Forum and MAP process, and the reform of laws 
related to the Unilever case, several treaties remain unratified. Kenya has signed eight 
TIEAs, as shown in Table 1, but not a single one has been ratified. The process of 
negotiating and signing TIEAs took more than three years, and this reflects a lack of political 
will in Kenya to join in the sharing of information.34 Since Kenya signed the Multilateral 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (MCMAATM) in February 
2016, it could be said that the TIEAs are no longer needed – all the countries with which 
Kenya signed TIEAS have signed and ratified the MCMAATM, except for Monaco. However, 
Kenya has still to ratify the MCMAATM, and its failure to ratify the TIEAs is a bad omen. 
 
One possible reason for this lack of political will regarding exchange of tax information is that 
there is little separation of the state and business in Kenya, with many politicians having 
involvement – including a share of ownership – in both local and multinational corporations. 
These connections create concern about the role of the political elite and its impact on the 
regulation of corporate entities, as those who approve the regulations and laws in parliament 
are often themselves directly affected. This concern may arise from a lack of awareness in 
the country’s political class on how information would be used and the possibility of 
victimisation, as well as fear of discovery of illicitly-gotten gains held abroad. KRA officials, 
already having difficulty with the current regulations, feel there needs to be more clarity on 
how this process is expected to work under BEPS. 
 
3.5 Technical obstacles  
 
After building a legal framework, ensuring there is political will and that KRA capacity is 
developed, the remaining challenge is to apply the TP rules to prevent profit shifting. Under 
current Kenyan TP procedures there are several issues that provide technical challenges – 
particularly, access to information across borders, methods used to make the assessments 
and the database accessed. This sub-section assesses the challenges facing the Kenyan TP 
unit in these three areas.  
 
3.5.1 Comparables 
 
The lack of adequate comparables within existing databases is a problem in the case of 
developed countries, and practitioners are sceptical of public and secret comparables (UN 
2013: 21). The data in some industries is predominantly based on small family businesses, 
with the result that 90 per cent of comparables between southern and northern Europe are of 
no effective use.35 As a result the extension of these comparables to the developing world is 
not always reliable; you may only have ten years of data, without an understanding of the 
whole value chain. In addition, the volatility of currencies can make analysis, and later audit, 
of TP transactions very difficult.36 
 
Different databases give different results not only for commodities, but also intellectual 
property- and royalty-based issues. KRA currently only accesses the Orbis system (Bureau 
van Dijk n.d.). One respondent suggested that the database to be used should be prescribed 
in law or by regulation.37 KRA subscribed to the Orbis database in 2011; Orbis has 
information on over 100 million private companies, 65 thousand listed companies and around 
90 million individuals. Many taxpayers in Kenya use Amadeus, which is a sub-set of Orbis. 
                                                 
34  Interview 9. It was also pointed out that a TIEA could be quickly approved under the exemption in article (4) of the TP 
regulations, since these are regulatory changes. 
35  Interview 4. 
36  Interview 4, 6 and 7. 
37  Interview 9. 
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Because of the inherent defects in foreign databases, the comparables derived end up not 
giving clear results, due to the difficulty of determining appropriate adjustment for economic 
circumstances. Currently Orbis has 2,662,476 companies listed from Africa. It has 12,529 
companies from Kenya. However, a preliminary search conducted in 2016 produced only 
100 companies from different industries with complete or largely complete data after 2004. 
Therefore it is debatable whether this is usable at all for comparables.  
 
In order to even begin to build a usable database of comparables, certain markers must be in 
place. First, the local company registry must be updated and digitised to allow for local 
comparables. This is a problem in Kenya, as the company registry has still not been updated; 
digitisation began in the mid-1990s, and remains incomplete.  
 
Second, many foreign-owned companies in Kenya are in effect economic monopolies, and it 
is not possible to compare prices with those paid by locally-owned businesses. Data shows 
that there are approximately 300 MNEs in Kenya in consumer goods, large-scale 
construction, and banking and finance. Since many of these products cannot be produced by 
local companies, these MNEs effectively control and set domestic prices. This makes it 
almost impossible to place them on the same footing as a local manufacturer of goods or 
services, whose products tend to be more expensive than the foreign MNE’s. 
 
Third, some argue that digitisation of the economy has led to the loss of a paper trail, making 
an adequate audit almost impossible. Evidence rules in the court system often require hard 
copies; electronic copies are often considered unacceptable. 
 
Fourth, commercial databases are compiled from accounts filed by companies with the 
relevant administrative bodies, and presented in an electronic format suitable for searches 
and statistical analysis (OECD 2010, 2015b, 2015a). Databases do not normally include data 
on transactions, and can only be used for comparable profit data. Inherent challenges 
associated with the use of databases include:  
 
1. Databases rely on publicly available information. Information in the database is not 
available from all countries; unique conditions in some countries mean that these 
countries cannot be compared with Kenya.  
2. Even where information is publicly-available, not all countries have the same amount of 
publicly available information about their companies.  
3. Even where the same level of detail is required, the information contained therein can be 
significantly different depending on the legal form of the company, and whether the 
company is listed or not.  
4. Databases are compiled and presented for non-transfer pricing purposes, making them 
inherently unsuitable for transfer pricing purposes.  
 
3.5.2 Choice of method 
 
There remain certain differences between Kenyan law and regulations and the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines which they are expected to mirror, despite all the reforms 
undertaken so far. First, paragraph 7 of the Kenyan TP regulations covers the methods to be 
applied in determination of the arm’s length price. The methods included the normal five, as 
well as a sixth – any other method with the prior approval of the Commissioner. A similar 
clause can be found in transfer pricing legislation of other countries, such as Hungary, India, 
Israel, Taiwan and Thailand.  
 
Second, paragraph 8 does not have preference for any method, but instead allows the 
taxpayer to choose which they consider most suitable. However, in practice the 
 28 
Commissioner General has been known to refuse use of other methods38 when a more 
suitable one is available within the first five, and there have been no challenges to this 
approach as yet.39 There is a potential risk to prescribing a new method in that there may be 
insufficient details of the methodology to be followed in its application, and the already-
overwhelmed TP unit’s work simply gets more complex (Chege 2012, 2013). There would 
need to be a definition of the method and when the sixth option could be exercised, which 
would require additional regulations or a practice note from the Commissioner General. 
However, approval under this provision could be given on an ad hoc basis by the 
Commissioner General, although undesireable, especially if tied in under sections 62-69 of 
the Tax Procedure Act (2015). Currently there is predominant use of the TNNM method, 
since the CUP method was found problematic – as seen in the Unilever case.40  
 
Third, paragraph 9 reiterates section 56 of the Income Tax Act, giving the Commissioner 
power to call for information as set out in paragraph 9 of the rules.41 However despite some 
taxpayers repeatedly failing to provide information, this continues unabated since there are 
no special penalties for failure to submit records. Finally, it was realised that the rules were 
not as elaborate as anticipated. From the wording of the rules, it was evident that they were 
based on the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines of 1995,42 and perhaps some reference 
ought to be made to the UN model. Since the court in Unilever referred to the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines when there were no Kenyan regulations, presumably since there 
are no discussions in Kenya, arguably, discussions under the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines could also similarly be adopted using the precedent of this case. Currently, 
Tanzania has a statutory provision saying that its TP regulations should be interpreted in 
accordance with both the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the UN Manual; this adds to 
concern since Tanzania is also not a member of the OECD, and has not been involved in the 
drafting of these guidelines – which are designed to suit OECD countries and not developing 
countries. 
 
3.5.3 Access to information 
 
Access to information from other tax authorities has been upon request. In the past requests 
have been ignored completely by some countries, including the UK.43 Recently, while the UK 
shared information in one case upon request, Germany declined stating that its 
understanding was that the information requested did not fall within the parameters of what 
they were expected to share. The actual information requested remained confidential and 
was therefore not accessible.44 As a result, the KRA are discussing the need to renegotiate 
the DTA with Germany.45 However, there is no data available on the number of requests 
                                                 
38  Interview 9. 
39  Earlier, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines ranked traditional transactional methods (CUP, cost plus and resale 
price) higher than transactional profit methods (TNMM and profit split). However, the 2010 version of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines relaxed this requirement by providing for selection of the most appropriate method to the 
circumstance of each case. However, the Guidelines retain some ambivalence, e.g. in Para 2.3, on p.59 they state that 
where a traditional transaction method and a transactional profit method can be applied in an equally reliable manner, 
the traditional transaction method is preferable to the transactional profit method. Moreover, where the CUP and 
another transfer pricing method can be applied in an equally reliable manner, the CUP method is to be preferred.  
40  Interview 13. 
41  The paragraph lists the documents that the Commissioner could demand that have a direct relevance to the transfer 
pricing issue. These documents relates to; the selection of the transfer pricing method, the application of the method, 
the global organisation structure of the enterprise, details of the transaction under consideration, the assumptions, 
strategies, and policies applied in selecting the method; and such other background information as may be necessary 
regarding the transaction. 
42  Therefore to expound on the rules it became necessary to still rely on the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as soft law. 
Details of the application of transfer pricing methods are set out in the OECD Rules. The rules provide for four transfer 
pricing methods namely comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP), resale price method (RPM), cost plus method 
(CPM) and transactional net margin method (TNMM). Traditionally TNMM is the most popular method. This method 
requires the use of commercial databases to establish comparables. 
43  Interview 8. 
44  Interview 9. 
45  Interview 9. 
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made, or whether there have been any requests for information from KRA. Hopefully, with 
the signed Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement (MCAA) and CbCR commitments 
from multinational companies and countries, KRA will be able to draw on automatic 
exchange of information on multinationals doing business in Kenya. 
 
One strategy of the TP unit has been to only look into companies resident in countries that 
have treaties in force with Kenya, from which information could be requested. A recent 
provision has named the Commissioner General as the competent authority for tax treaty 
purposes, especially for matters of exchange of information (Government of Kenya 2016: 
Appendix B). Nevertheless, KRA finds it difficult to obtain information from those countries 
(Chege 2012, 2013). Since work is based on targets and collections, staff focus on the easier 
audits – those involving countries with which relations exist. 
 
In addition to information from countries with which there is direct interaction, extensive 
knowledge is needed on all the other companies that form part of an MNE structure globally. 
This requires more domestic laws, as well as renegotiation of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements. The MCAA and CbCR may bridge this gap, where meaningfully accessed. 
There needs to be available information on investment deduction and incentives in order to 
calculate the real tax, and not the legislated amount, in agreeing on share of profit. This 
becomes important when FDI concessions are granted through policy or state-MNE 
contracts, which reduce the effective tax rate. This was seen in the case of Apple Computers 
in Northern Ireland, where the legislated tax rate was 12.5 per cent but effective payment 
was approximately 3 per cent. A state could opt for more information being provided through 
legislation, as well as changes in international tax law rules on access of information, with a 
single understanding of the information required. 
 
The companies being assessed are not all from countries with which Kenya has DTAs. There 
is little data on home-grown Kenyan MNEs, which tend to operate predominantly in other 
developing countries in the region, and other domestic companies not engaged in cross-
border trade, which could ideally be used to populate a comparables database. As a result, 
KRA may be losing out from both MNEs resident in other jurisdictions as well as MNEs 
resident in Kenya.46  
 
3.6 Some success 
 
Despite the challenges set out above, there has been some success. In 2015, the OECD 
released a statement that advice from their staff helped net KRA more than US$23 million in 
a single TP case (Katz 2015). KRA Commission General, John Njiraini, on 4 March 2016, 
stated that the audit of over thirty multinational companies had recovered KShs15 billion in 
extra taxes, while thirty other cases are pending – it is not clear if this was all from TP audits. 
This suggests that the KRA is raising more by applying stronger versions of the TP rules. 
However, there is also evidence that tax advisers are beginning to challenge some of these 
rulings, relating to comparability adjustments, and the KRA may not be able to maintain 
these higher collections (Irungu 2015). 
 
The speed of response to documentation requests has improved, as has the availability of 
MNE staff, including directors, when called in for discussions. A simple request for a meeting 
can result in the presence of both the directors, and also more recently their legal 
representatives and auditors, who instruct the directors when not to answer questions. When 
a matter goes to the Tax Appeal Tribunal (previously the Local Committee), foreign lawyers, 
including foreign experts, are being brought in by the taxpayer. To date KRA has won all 
Local Committee cases, while it has only lost one court case: Unilever. In several instances 
court matters have been resolved and withdrawn before a final determination by the judge: 
                                                 
46  Interview 9. 
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Sara Lee and Karuturi, which is still unresolved. KRA’s TP unit has been appraised by 
several international bodies, and given a high rating. 
 
Some comments can be made in conclusion. First, due to the complexity of transfer pricing, it 
seems that the teams are still too small, need more technical training, are underfinanced, 
and cannot as a result hire additional TP staff. However, they have the full support of the 
KRA, and their assessments are supported to the level of potential litigation.47 Concentrating 
training on the limited numbers in the KRA TP unit has meant that frontline tax auditors have 
not been trained how to pick up the markers of basic TP and tax avoidance or evasion 
issues. Second, since experience and understanding of a range of different industries are 
required, it is very difficult to detect risk factors. KRA officials continue to struggle – first to 
gain industry knowledge, before even beginning to try to apply TP rules; then they are moved 
on to the next case, where they start the process all over again, but in a different industry. 
Finally, even after gaining industry understanding, the lack of suitable comparables is one of 
the main impediments to being able to check whether there is any avoidance or evasion 
taking place.  
 
Between 2013 and 2016 there have been huge strides made in the international tax system, 
especially due to the OECD BEPS project. This has resulted in extensive recommendations 
for changes to the global tax system. The KRA TP teams have seemingly made some 
significant progress in collecting taxes under the current TP regulations, but will this be 
enough to apply these changing rules effectively? What changes may be needed to amend 
or revise domestic laws in a developing country like Kenya to implement these changes? 
More broadly, are the proposals resulting from the BEPS project, in which Kenya has been 
participating, useful for Kenya, and what additional changes at the international, continental 
and possibly regional as well as domestic levels might be required to ensure a sustainable 
improvement in Kenya’s tax collection through the application of transfer pricing rules? 
Section 4 will look into these new challenges in the light of the outcomes of the BEPS 
project.  
  
 
4  Analysing BEPS solutions in the Kenyan 
context 
 
The September 2014 Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country 
Reporting proposed a new Chapter V to be included in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines. It provides ‘guidance for tax administrations to take into account in developing 
rules and/or procedures on documentation to be obtained from taxpayers in connection with 
a transfer pricing enquiry or risk assessment’. Further details about the proposed procedures 
for filing and access, especially to the CbCRs, were published in the Guidance on the 
Implementation of Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting of 6 
February 2015. The BEPS project intended to produce ‘key elements’ for legislative 
provisions (which could be adapted to local law), and for the secondary mechanisms, by April 
2015. The aim is to establish common rules for documentation requirements among all 
countries participating in the system, to apply to all MNEs except the aviation industry, which 
remains exempt from BEPS. There are two core issues analysed in this paper: the 
documentation that a developing country revenue authority requires and where the 
information will be filed, stored and accessed, and how it will be shared (OECD 2015a). The 
Report on Action 13 was released in September 2015, and a guidance document in June 
2016.  
 
                                                 
47  Interviews 1, 2 and 3. 
 31 
The changing international landscape poses new challenges for the KRA. Kenya has been 
actively engaged at the OECD in the BEPS project, as one of the fourteen non-OECD non-
G20 states that joined in December 2014. It has also joined the Global Forum on 
Transparency, as well as signing the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance (although this has not yet been ratified), arguably to ensure that the international 
standards required for accessibility of information are fulfilled. Kenya must consider whether 
and how to implement the reforms introduced through the BEPS project, especially the 
extensive changes to the TP Guidelines, including country-by-country reporting and TP 
documentation requirements. The UN will be releasing revisions. A Kenyan view on this is 
important, for domestic clarity and regional harmony; many African countries watch Kenya 
very carefully before deciding which direction they choose to take.  
 
This section sets out the results of an additional nine interviews using the questionnaire 
attached in Appendix A, which were conducted between November 2015 and March 2016. 
Interviews discussed both the legal fiscal framework and data: the type, quality and how it 
will be handled. They included the KRA, MNEs, accountants, lawyers and civil society.48 
Challenges were identified that are faced by all the stakeholders in countries generally, and 
the specific problems of developing countries that deserve consideration in the domestication 
of these changes in international tax. The challenges discussed ranged from governance 
issues, confidentiality issues (in different dimensions), to specific and technical issues 
surrounding transfer pricing.  
 
4.1 The legal framework and its interpretation  
 
BEPS moves forward on a presumption that the tax systems of all countries are at the same 
level of sophistication. In most OECD countries self-assessment tax return forms are 
prefilled; the system in place is already interlinked with all other systems in government, and 
simply requires that the taxpayer confirm or vary the information that the KRA already has in 
calculating taxes. In Kenya, however, the Companies’ Registry49 is neither updated and 
digitised, nor linked to the revenue authority. As a result the data that could be used to cross-
check sources is not available domestically. Although the iTax system currently being set up 
envisages a future where this would be possible, there is no clear timeline for completion. An 
attempt was made in 2013, and again in early 2017, to locate the data of several local MNEs 
through the registry, and the most recent data provided was 1969 or 1983 for some locally-
registered global MNEs. BEPS moves forward on the premise that incorporation documents, 
profit and loss and balance sheet data are accessible and available. BEPS does not take the 
absence of this data into account. As a result, while countries like Kenya would most likely 
require a little more information than an OECD member state faced with the same company’s 
tax audit,50 most developing countries may have little or no data available at all. 
 
Due to the major changes in global laws, policies and recommendations involved in the 
BEPS project and related initiatives, the Kenyan government could usefully establish a 
permanent advisory board of local tax experts to make suggestions for reform, similar to the 
Davis Tax Committee in South Africa. Given the current flux in international tax law, the 
policy section of a revenue authority could not possibly cope with the numerous suggestions 
for amendments from a fairly large revenue authority like KRA. These would also need to be 
reflected upon with reference to the state’s fiscal and economic policy, which should be 
housed within the Treasury and Ministry of Finance. This could be a good solution to keeping 
the revenue authority aware and ahead of global rule changes, including, for example, 
requesting that this committee develop domestic TP rules to support the work of the TP unit.  
                                                 
48  Appendix A. 
49  This is also referred to as Companies House in other jurisdictions, and is the official government public registry of all 
companies resident within a state. It has the additional requirement of having public access to the annual accounts of all 
companies accessible at a small fee. 
50  Interview 11. 
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4.2 Capacity 
 
4.2.1 Revenue authority capacity 
 
A key gap is the need for knowledge and experience of the main industry sectors under 
audit. This was evident even within the current framework, and under the BEPS reforms such 
expertise will be even more important. Revisions of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines resulting 
from BEPS Actions 8-10 strengthen the powers of revenue authorities to re-characterise 
transactions, based on a functional analysis of each MNE group. This requires an in-depth 
understanding of business structures in the different economic sectors concerned.  
 
This means that in addition to the strengthening of capacity on TP rules, applying them to the 
different types of industries will remain a challenge as long as the main thrust of TP laws and 
regulations continues to require this type of functional analysis. Since Kenya has twelve 
people working on TP, and it takes two or three people on average two to three years to 
complete auditing a single case, focusing on understanding another industry in the same 
period is an almost insurmountable obstacle. Despite the large amount of training that KRA 
transfer pricing specialists have been receiving, the KRA, MNE representatives and 
accountants interviewed were unanimous on the lack of capacity of the TP unit. The lack of 
industry understanding by revenue authority officials in developing countries has led to a 
focus primarily on formal matters.51 As a result it seems that, while there is extensive 
theoretical knowledge, and some growth of practical knowledge, there is still a lack of 
experience and knowledge on the different business models and how they are applied in 
different industries. 
 
As already mentioned, since training on TP issues has been focused on the TP unit, auditors 
in other departments lack the knowledge to pick up TP-related issues.52 This results in both 
siloing of knowledge and experience, and fostering a feeling of incompetence amongst 
mainstream tax auditors. A remedy to be considered is that the discovery of a TP issue 
outside the unit should lead to the concerned auditor being allowed to work the case with the 
TP unit, in order to spread capacity and build awareness across all departments. For KRA to 
take this to the next level they are concerned about: one is a structural problem, as KRA 
does not do risk assessments well as the reliance on tip-offs remains key. In addition, there 
are not enough good people. Non-TP officers need to be identified – including outside 
Nairobi – to ensure audits of MNE companies based outside Nairobi are carried out more 
effectively.53 
 
4.2.2 Tribunal and judiciary capacity 
 
Due to the complexity of TP cases, almost every additional assessment raised following TP 
audits ends up being objected. Pursuant to section 86(1) b of the Income Tax Act, a taxpayer 
may appeal to the Tax Appeal Tribunal against the Commissioner‘s determination of the 
objection. Most transfer pricing appeal cases end up in the Tax Appeal Tribunal (previously 
referred to as the Local Committee). However, since the decisions remain private, data on 
this remains inaccessible. Tribunal members are not trained in TP, and on several occasions 
have indicated that TP issues are too complex for their current level of skills in tax. This 
poses a risk in the sense that some decisions made at the Tribunal may not be founded upon 
sound reasoning, or, even if they are, the rationale may not have been clearly expressed. 
This was the case in the Unilever case, where the judge observed: ‘Unfortunately, I do not 
have the benefit of the reasoning by the Local Committee, and am bound therefore to 
consider this appeal in terms of the arguments advanced before me’.  
                                                 
51  Interviews 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10. 
52  Interview 6. 
53  Interview 7. 
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A similar capacity issue is likely to play out in Kenya‘s judiciary, largely due to the manner in 
which the judiciary is structured. Tax appeals are dealt with at the Commercial Court, which 
also handles other matters of commercial nature. This court has no judges with a 
specialisation in tax law. However cases involving MNEs are treated carefully, and the 
Unilever case took two years to be finalised within the court system. Accessing domestic 
experts independently on these issues is becoming of crucial concern, especially since the 
judiciary also has a commercial dispute resolution arm. 
 
4.3 Governance 
 
There were two concerns highlighted in the case of governance: lack of political will and 
corruption. As concerns lack of political will, it was pointed out that many DTAs have been 
pending in negotiations for several years – some more than a decade. This is seen as a sign 
of lack of political will from both countries in the negotiation process to provide not only the 
foreign, but also the local, MNEs with the ability to avoid double taxation when possible. 
However it also impedes the work of the revenue authority, and its ability to access data in 
countries with whom there is no DTA or TIEA in place.54  
 
The MNEs and accountants repeatedly highlighted corruption in diverse ways. They 
expressed their concern over situations in other countries where revenue authority officials 
were known to have either sold data to competitors or extorted money from MNEs in 
exchange for not releasing their data that they had in their possession to the public.55 As a 
result, concerns around refusal to provide documents upon request by revenue authorities, 
especially in developing countries, continue to be an issue. 
 
4.4 Technical obstacles within existing transfer pricing regulations 
 
There was a lot of input on the technical issues regarding BEPS requirements. This section 
is therefore split into technical concerns voiced: comparables, choice of TP formula, access 
to information and the supply of disaggregated data. 
 
4.4.1 Comparables 
 
Globally there is a debate whether the scarcity of comparables is merely a technical issue, or 
if in fact the OECD-based guidelines are premised on the mistaken assumption that 
transactions entered into by uncontrolled parties are economically equivalent to transactions 
entered into by members of commonly controlled groups. As a result, it is possible that 
because of the impossibility of sound technical analysis using comparables, transfer pricing 
issues in Kenya and elsewhere are really being resolved more through political negotiation 
rather than by objective application of rules and regulations (Picciotto 2016; Avi-Yonah 
2000).  
 
In Kenya, the issue of comparables remains unresolved by all the legislation, regulation and 
policy changes in place. The post-BEPS rules will still require comparables. There will be a 
Toolkit on this question, which may recommend safe harbours. KRA officers come across a 
lot of information relevant for benchmarking in the course of their work. This information is 
only available to the tax administration by dint of section 125(1) of Income Tax Act, and if 
used would result in what are referred to as secret comparables.56 A secret comparable 
generally means the use of information about a taxpayer by the revenue authority to form a 
                                                 
54  Interview 9. 
55  Interview 4. 
56  Section 125. (1): An officer and any other person employed in carrying out the provisions of this Act shall regard and 
deal with all documents and information relating to the income of a person and all confidential instructions in respect of 
the administration of the Income Tax Department which may come into his possession or to his knowledge in the course 
of his duties as secret. 
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basis of risk assessment of another taxpayer, where the second taxpayer is not given access 
to that information as it may reveal confidential information about a competitor’s operations. 
Although the income tax TP rules do not have clarity on the issue of secret comparables, the 
rules of procedure require that ‘he who avers must prove’, meaning that the taxpayer must 
provide the Commissioner General with the data it has used to determine the arm’s length 
price or margin as set out in section 56 of the Tax Procedure Act (2015). This means that so-
called secret comparables cannot be used in Kenya. This being the case, comparables for 
use in benchmarking remain one of the greatest challenges in the administration of the arm’s 
length principle. This means that local industry comparables outside a database are of no 
use. 
 
4.4.2 Choice of TP method 
 
Since countries have little or no data with respect to developing economies as well as the 
many conflict and post-conflict states in Africa, the choice of method in a developing country 
becomes a greater challenge. As a result many countries fall back on simple measures like 
net margin on sales, because that is the only thing that is realistically obtainable from third-
party data. One respondent suggested that this in effect turns corporate income tax into a 
sales tax on cross-border trade. 57 However, in more complex transactions the choice is 
usually between the transactional net margin method and the profit split method. The TNMM 
is commonly used by developing country revenue authorities because it allows some profit to 
be taxed; the MNE perspective is to look at the method with the most certainty. It is unclear 
whether KRA prefers one method or tries to use all of them, and what criteria they use to 
select a method. 58 The BEPS proposals provide no additional guidance on this issue.  
 
4.4.3 Access to information 
 
The KRA approach is that, by ensuring the recognition of Kenya internationally by being part 
of these international benchmarks and agreements, when the time comes to access 
information for TP purposes MNEs and other revenue authorities will deem KRA trustworthy 
to handle the data, and will share information that will enable tax collection. As a result, 
Kenya has made several changes to both its physical infrastructure, building a special secure 
room to house TP-related data receive from other countries, and its regulations, in order to 
build trust with both other revenue authorities as well as with the MNE taxpayer. However, 
several issues remain unresolved.  
 
TP analysis and documentation requirements  
 
Following the BEPS project, three types of documentation templates (local file, master file 
and CbCR) delineate the type of information the revenue authority will access. On the whole 
CbCR and transfer pricing documentation are a diagnostic tool for tax authorities. 59. Local 
file and master file data does give in-depth information that is critical for a revenue authority 
to understand the company structure and related parties. The local file is also useful for 
identifying risk areas. There is no real impact on business, but simply an additional 
administrative process. However it is clear that the data requested from the CbCR, master 
file and local file will be very helpful for revenue authorities to understand the company better 
before beginning an audit.60 
 
Under current rules in Kenya, there is no clarity for companies as to where they should 
submit their TP policies. There should be a specific place for all MNEs to file additional 
                                                 
57  Interview 4. 
58  Interview 4. 
59  Interview 4.  
60  Interviews 4 and 5. 
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documents that currently go to the KRA with general filing of all taxpayer data.61 This 
problem is growing, since increased automation of the revenue authority is making it 
impossible to submit additional data voluntarily if no option is given for this on the KRA iTax 
website – including for the master file and local file. Revenue authorities in some countries 
have one office for all MNEs,62 and the KRA could consider instituting an office like this, to be 
the repository for TP policy documents. Concern about access to information stemming from 
questions that MNEs consistently and repeatedly pose on protection of competition-sensitive 
data would then be resolved.  
 
In addition, there are no standards on what the TP policy document should contain. It may be 
useful to consider OECD templates for both the master file and local file. It is, however, 
unclear whether the KRA plans to do so. This information needs to be elaborated at domestic 
level through both legislation and regulation. One suggestion already in place in India is that 
the policy should go through the private auditor, who would then declare its truth and fairness 
together with the submission of the audited accounts.63 This could already be done through 
either the provisions on public rulings under sections 52-59 of the Tax Procedure Act, or 
under rule 9 of the TP Regulations (2006). 
 
Confidentiality  
 
The information categories of concern to MNEs were identified as: formula and recipes which 
have intellectual property dimensions, databases that contain client information, and data 
that is used in marketing or otherwise that may be critical for competitive advantage.64 With 
these concerns in mind, it is presumed that once concerns on confidentiality, accessibility 
and use are addressed, sharing of data would be possible. However, under current rules, the 
MNEs’ perspective was a preference towards revenue authorities getting information from 
their local MNE affiliate – one KRA official also said this is usually the quickest way to access 
data generally.65 However other KRA officials observed that MNEs were sometimes uneasy 
about disclosing global information to their local affiliates.66  
 
The use of a central database that would require a password to access select data based on 
need was dismissed as utopian by MNE directors, who saw it as a threat to confidentiality 
and open to hacking. Questions of control, a lack of clarity on how it would operate and costs 
involved remain unanswered.67 It was also pointed out that the supplier of information would 
never be certain it would be used in the same way as in the country where it was collected. 
This has already come out from parliamentary sources querying whether data will be treated 
as confidential.  
 
It was also stated that to ensure confidentiality the KRA needed a dedicated secure space to 
house data. An assessment of the physical location where data would be located – a 
sectioned-off corner of one floor of the KRA, where only two members of staff would be 
allowed to access and work with the data – passed the test when presented to MNE directors 
and auditors. In addition, any queries handled would be done without reference to possible 
TP-based concerns, to ensure the strictest levels of confidentiality.68 There was support for 
the BEPS aim that CbCR should be the same for all countries, to ease the process of access 
of information.69 
                                                 
61  Interview 6. 
62  Interview 4.  
63  Interview 7. 
64  Interview 4. 
65  Interview 10.  
66  Interview 9 and 10. 
67  Interview 10. 
68  Interview 9. 
69  Interview 10. 
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Additional concerns raised were: (a) more rules would have to be put in place before data 
could be sent from the tax authority head office to local offices, and (b) there will always be a 
large gap in perceptions between MNEs and revenue authorities. MNEs are perceived as 
dishonest and engaging in tax evasion, and MNEs think the revenue authority is corrupt.70 
Trust, therefore, remains the biggest impediment to the exchange of information globally. 
 
4.5 Unresolved technical obstacles within the BEPS regulations 
 
Despite the aim of the BEPS process to resolve the major problems in cross-border taxation, 
revenue authorities like the KRA still have problems in implementing international transfer 
pricing rules. Among the priorities for Kenya and other developing countries, which are not 
addressed in the BEPS process, are:  
 
 Major challenges in taxing the mining and transport industries.  
 There is no additional data that allows for selection of one of the six TP methods. It gives 
some conditions, but not to the depth required. A TP report needs to contain the policy 
and methodology, but not the basis for an audit, in order to understand a company and 
the choices made. However if you need additional information, it will be 
counterproductive and require more administrative work for the company, with no 
explanation from the revenue authority. Additional questions would probably need to be 
phrased on: (i) transaction flows, (ii) choice of TP method, and (iii) which data was used 
for these choices. 
 The new BEPS proposals do not make it any easier for revenue authorities to get 
information on sub-contracting. MNEs sometimes refuse to give information on sub-
contracting arrangements. In Kenya the shifting of supply of goods and services to a sub-
contractor may make it possible to sidestep entirely the reforms being proposed under 
BEPS.71  
 The price data available in the databases of comparables is inadequate in various ways. 
It does not take into account differences in quality of products or services. In reality, the 
market value of, for example, roses at the point of export may vary considerably. Some 
are produced under special conditions and are of high quality. Others are for a mass 
market. The absence of comparables price data for many products is an even bigger 
problem.  
 The issue of brokers who are related parties, but do not represent themselves as related 
but independent, is unresolved. In cases such as the purchase of grains and other 
agricultural commodities, local companies have an agreement with large MNEs and 
source products. They allow the broker to negotiate farmers down as low as possible, 
and then, instead of paying a commission to an independent broker, pay a service fee to 
the related party and register the profit in a low tax jurisdiction.72 
 An issue that seems to have escaped the notice of OECD BEPS is that of home-grown 
MNEs in developing countries. All MNEs over €750 million turnover need to provide this 
documentation. Countries like Kenya have their own home-grown MNEs, which have 
already hit this threshold – for example, Kenol/Kobil and Safaricom (see Table 3). 73 
These companies also need to be compliant, but it remains unclear whether they are 
even aware of the new BEPS provisions.  
 
Finally, another possible reason for the lack of clarity emanates from challenges in 
negotiations going on at state level. These may include interested states wanting to exempt 
particular industries from the process where they have the highest vested interest – including 
                                                 
70  This statement was repeated by many of those interviewed including KRA officials, MNE representatives and 
accountants. 
71  Interview 9. 
72  Interview 9. 
73  Interview 7. 
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food commodities, aviation and shipping, and mining – as well as blocking the use of 
formulary apportionment.  
 
 
5  Recommendations  
 
The application of TP rules seems to be based on a fiction, resulting in attribution of low 
profits to operating affiliates. Kenya, being a developing country and predominantly a source 
state, is home to these affiliates. As a result even, where TP rules are being properly applied, 
it continues to face numerous challenges. This paper comes to two levels of 
recommendations. 
 
First, there is a need for Kenyans to reflect on whether the country should be trying to 
implement transfer pricing rules, rely on withholding tax as an alternative, or argue the case 
for global alternatives like unitary taxation and formulary apportionment.74 A Kenyan 
equivalent of the Davis Tax Committee in South Africa may be a good forum for such a 
discussion. 
 
Second, current transfer pricing rules are complex and need very skilled staff. Countries like 
Kenya can attempt to apply them because they get extensive capacity building. This can 
produce some immediate positive results, as taxpayers adjust accounts to get through the 
new more stringent audits. Within transfer pricing, it will first be necessary to assess the 
effectiveness of the arm’s length rule, which seems to be causing difficulty globally, rather 
than simply choosing to entrench a system that seems defective. 
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
As one follows the journey Kenya has taken and continues to take, certain concerns remain 
important at all stages.  
 
 First, the democratic deficit in the world has led to Kenya joining the on-going processes 
within the OECD, where it is considered a full participant, but not a member, of the 
OECD. The question remains whether Kenya can be a full participant when it has joined 
the process late, the agenda has been set, and the solutions already decided upon by 
OECD member states. In effect joining now means a commitment to applying proposals 
decided upon by others. These do not prioritise Kenya’s concerns, but rather add Kenya 
as an implementer of the prioritised concerns of OECD member states in a globalised 
world.  
 Second, there are key concerns that remain unanswered, and after the BEPS project 
seem to have grown: capacity, comparables and access to information.  
 Third, there is the continuing problem of the inability or unwillingness of governments of 
developing countries to engage in collective action over international tax issues. Political 
elites not directly involved in tax collection remain unaware of the changes required to do 
the job fairly.  
 Fourth, while some developing countries are recipients of tax-related information under 
official information exchange arrangements, countries like Kenya will be both recipients 
and providers of information. While their processes may be partially set up to receive 
information, their systems for providing information are almost non-existent.  
 
                                                 
74  See Picciotto (2017b). 
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The issues being raised in TP have been only partially resolved through capacity building 
and improved regulations and policy. Some additional concerns are being resolved through 
the BEPS project proposals. However, it is clear the process does not seem to be trying to 
resolve the problems created by foisting a set of complex and unwieldy rules on relatively 
poor developing and middle-income countries. While the BEPS project is a small step 
forward, it is already starting to feel like a bandage on a seeping wound. It will simply be a 
matter of time before the increased knowledge and experience in the developing world will 
force the issue and its inherent problems back to the surface, with even greater complexity.  
 
The debate that this paper tries to unpack is whether standard international transfer pricing 
rules are intrinsically appropriate, but fail to work in Kenya as a result of poor capacity and 
other internal impediments to implementation. Those on the other side of the debate argue 
that the transfer pricing rules in themselves are inoperable, and therefore the entire system 
needs to be replaced. This paper clearly shows that, while increased capacity may in itself 
allow for some increased collection at the outset, in the long term the same obstacles come 
back to undermine effective application of the rules – in Kenya, and wherever else local 
institutions are unable to cope with rules designed for a very different context. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A Country-by-country reporting survey 
 
1. Please state your name and position. 
Name Position 
  
 
2. What do you know about ‘Country-by-Country Reporting’? 
A lot Some things Nothing 
   
 
2.1. If you know something or a lot, how did you learn about it? 
Publications on the subject   
Attendance at International ATAF Events  
Attendance at International OECD Events  
Attendance at Other International Events  
None of the above (If you mark this option, please 
provide the manner in which you acquired knowledge on 
the subject) 
 
 
3. Has your tax administration had trouble in obtaining relevant information from or about a multinational company for 
tax audit purposes? If so, please explain briefly the nature of the difficulty. Yes 
Description of the difficulty Mention if your TA has taken or is planning an action to solve 
this 
  
  
  
  
 
4. Would your needs be satisfied by the information to be supplied in (i) the Country-by-Country Report, (ii) Master File, 
or (iii) Local File?.  
Yes No (Please justify) 
 
 
  
 
4.1. If you previous answer was yes, please complete the following table: 
Please describe your needs For each need, please provide the manner in which the OECD CbCR 
proposals help satisfy your needs 
  
  
  
 
5. According to the OECD Guidance each country should ensure that its tax authorities have powers to obtain the 
Transfer Pricing Master File, and the Local File, from the local subsidiary of any multinational. They may also need the power to 
obtain the Country-by-Country Report, in case this is not supplied by the tax authority of the parent company. Do you consider 
there would be a need to amend your constitution, tax code or the regulations that address the verification and control powers of 
your tax administration to implement the aforementioned changes? 
Yes  
(If your answer is affirmative, please explain) 
No 
  
  
 
6. According to your country’s laws, your EoI network and the context in which your tax administration operates, what 
would be the best method to have access to the Country-by-Country Report?  
Criteria Please mark with ‘X’ the most 
preferable option 
Please explain why did you chose this 
option 
(i) From the MNE’s affiliate in your 
country. 
  
(ii) Through a central database (with 
controlled access), or  
  
(iii) From the parent company tax 
authority. 
  
 
7. If you had access, would you be able to use the information obtained by the Country -by-Country Report, (ii) Master 
File, or (iii) Local File in routine or general taxpayer control, audits or as proof in trials. If you would find the information useful for 
any other procedure, please provide it. 
If you answer is YES, please provide the instances in which 
the information would be useful. 
If your answer is NO, please provide an explanation of why 
the information wouldn´t be useful 
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Appendix B Authorisation of representative of competent authority 
 
GAZETTE NOTICE NO. 8230 
The Income Tax Act 
(Cap. 470) 
AUTHORIZATION OF REPRESENTATIVE OF COMPETENT AUTHORITY 
 
IT IS notified for general information that the Cabinet Secretary for the National Treasury, 
being the competent authority for the Agreements entered under section 41 and 41A of the 
Act, has appointed the Commissioner-General of the Kenya Revenue Authority as the 
authorised representative of the competent authority for the purpose of exchange of 
information in tax matters. 
 
The Commissioner-General shall act in consultation with the Cabinet Secretary in the 
performance of the functions attendant to this authorisation. 
 
Dated the 16th October, 2015. 
 
 
HENRY K. ROTICH 
Cabinet Secretary for the National Treasury. 
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Appendix C The Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Rules, 2006 
  
1. These Rules may be cited as the Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Rules, and shall come into 
operation on the 1st July, 2006)  
 
2. In these Rules, unless the context otherwise requires-―arm‘s length price‖ means the 
price payable in a transaction between independent enterprises; ―comparable transactions‖ 
means transactions between which there are no material differences, or in which reasonably 
accurate adjustment can be made to eliminate material differences; ―controlled transaction‖ 
means a transaction which is monitored to ensure payment of an arm‘s length price for 
goods or services; ―related enterprises‖ means one or more enterprises whereby-  
 
(a) one of the enterprises participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or 
capital of the other; or  
(b) a third person participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital or 
both.  
 
3. The purposes of these Rules are-  
 
(a) to provide guidelines to be applied by related enterprises, in determining the arm’s length 
prices of goods and service in transactions involving them, and  
(b) to provide administrative regulations, including the types of records and documentation to 
be submitted to the Commissioner by a person involved in transfer pricing arrangements.  
 
4. The taxpayer may choose a method to employ in determining the arm’s length price from 
among the methods set out in Rule 7.  
 
5. The guidelines referred to in rule 3 shall apply to 
 
(a) transactions between related enterprises within a multinational company, where one 
enterprise is located in, and is subject to tax in, Kenya, and the other is located outside 
Kenya;  
(b) transactions between a permanent establishment and its head office or other related 
branches, in which case the permanent establishment shall be treated as a distinct and 
separate enterprise from its head office and related branches. Transactions subject to Rules 
Methods  
 
6. The transactions subject to adjustment of prices under these Rules shall include-  
 
(a) the sale or purchase of goods;  
(b) the sale, purchase or lease of tangible assets;  
(c) the transfer, purchase or use of intangible assets;  
(d) the provision of services;  
(e) the lending or borrowing of money; and  
(f) any other transactions which may affect the profit or loss of the enterprise involved  
 
7. The methods referred to in rule 4 are the following-  
 
(a) the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method, in which the transfer price in a 
controlled transaction is compared with the prices in an uncontrolled transaction and 
accurate adjustments made to eliminate material price differences;  
(b) the resale price method, in which the transfer price of the produce is compared with the 
resale price at which the product is sold to an independent enterprise;  
Provided that in the application of this method the resale price shall be reduced by the resale 
price margin (the price margin indicated by the reseller);  
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(c) the cost plus method, in which costs are assessed using the costs incurred by the 
supplier of a product in a controlled transaction, with a mark-up added to make an 
appropriate profit in light of the functions performed, and the assets used and risks assumed 
by the supplier;  
(d)the profit split method, in which the profits earned in very closely interrelated controlled 
transactions are split among the related enterprises depending on the functions performed by 
each enterprise in relation to the transaction, and compared with a profit split among 
independent enterprises in a joint venture;  
(e) the transactional net margin method, in which the net profit margin attained by a 
multinational enterprise in a controlled transaction is compared to the net profit margin that 
would have been earned in comparable transactions by an independent enterprise; and  
(f) such other method as may be prescribed by the Commissioner from time to time, where in 
his opinion and in view of the nature of the transactions, the arm‘s length price cannot be 
determined using any of the methods contained in these guidelines.  
 
8 (1) The methods set out in Rule 7 shall be applied in determining the price payable for 
goods and services in transactions between related enterprises for the purposes of section 
18(3) of the Act.  
(2) A person shall apply the method most appropriate for his enterprise, having regard to the 
nature of the transaction, or class of transaction, or class of related persons or function 
performed by such persons in relation to the transaction.  
 
9 (1) The Commissioner may, where necessary, request a person to whom these Rules 
apply for information, including books of accounts and other documents relating to 
transactions where the transfer pricing is applied.  
(2) The documents referred to in paragraph (1) shall include documents relating to-  
(a) the selection of the transfer pricing method and the reasons for the selection;  
(b) the application of the method, including the calculations made and price adjustment 
factors considered; 178  
(c) the global organisation structure of the enterprise;  
(d) the details of the transaction under consideration;  
(e) the assumptions, strategies, and policies applied in selecting the method; and  
(f) such other background information as may be necessary regarding the transaction.  
(3) The books of accounts and other documents shall be prepared in, or be translated into, 
the English language, at the time the transfer price is arrived at.  
 
10 Where a person avers the application of arm‘s length pricing, such person shall-  
(a) develop an appropriate transfer pricing policy;  
(b) determine the arm‘s length price as prescribed under the guidelines provided under these 
Rules; and  
(c) avail documentation to evidence their analysis upon request by the Commissioner.  
 
11 The provisions of the Act relating to fraud, failure to furnish returns and underpayment of 
tax shall apply with respect to transfer pricing.  
 
12 Any tax due and unpaid in a transfer pricing arrangement shall be deemed to be 
additional tax for purposes of Section 94 and 95 of the Act. 
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